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The acknowledged importance of uncertainty in economic decision making has stimulated the
search for neural signals that could inﬂuence learning and inform decision mechanisms. Current
views distinguish two forms of uncertainty, namely risk and ambiguity, depending on whether the
probability distributions of outcomes are known or unknown. Behavioural neurophysiological
studies on dopamine neurons revealed a risk signal, which covaried with the standard deviation or
variance of the magnitude of juice rewards and occurred separately from reward value coding.
Human imaging studies identiﬁed similarly distinct risk signals for monetary rewards in the
striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), thus fulﬁlling a requirement for the mean variance
approach of economic decision theory. The orbitofrontal risk signal covaried with individual risk
attitudes, possibly explaining individual differences in risk perception and risky decision making.
Ambiguous gambles with incomplete probabilistic information induced stronger brain signals than
risky gambles in OFC and amygdala, suggesting that the brain’s reward system signals the partial
lack of information. The brain can use the uncertainty signals to assess the uncertainty of rewards,
inﬂuence learning, modulate the value of uncertain rewards and make appropriate behavioural
choices between only partly known options.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Every day we make decisions about the goals we like
to pursue, but we do not even know how the brain
processes the simplest parameters that determine
our decisions. Blaise Pascal 350 years ago employed
the emerging probability theory to postulate a
formal description of decision making. Outcomes of
our choices have speciﬁc magnitudes and occur
with speciﬁc probabilities. Therefore, they can be
adequately described by probability distributions of
outcome magnitudes. Pascal conjectured that humans
tend to select the option whose probability distri-
bution has the highest expected (mean) value
compared with all other options. However, choice
behaviour is also known to depend on uncertainty,
which refers to the width or spread of the probability
distribution. Experimental economic and behavioural
ecological studies have conﬁrmed that uncertainty is
ubiquitous, inﬂuences learning and contributes
crucially to the valuation of options during decision
making in such diverse situations as animals engaging
in foraging, ducks distributing proportionally to
food sources and bees choosing among different
ﬂowers, people deciding between exploration and
exploitation and buying into stock markets, companies
pricing insurance, and countries evaluating ﬁnancial,
military, social and environmental risks (McNamara &
Houston 1980; Harper 1982; Stephens & Krebs
1986; Real 1991; Sutton & Barto 1998; Holt & Laury
2002; McCoy et al. 2003; Bossaerts & Plott 2004;
Weber et al. 2004). Thus, the decision maker needs to
evaluate both the expected outcome values and the
uncertainty associated with the options. Attentional
learning rules, which provide better descriptions of
learning in some situations, propose that learning is
monotonically related to stimulus-driven forms of
attention that vary as a function of uncertainty about
reinforcers (Mackintosh 1975; Pearce & Hall 1980).
Thus, the abundance of uncertainty in the physical
and biological world is widespread and has substan-
tial, often crucial, impact on choice behaviour and
learning. These arguments make the investigation of
neural mechanisms of uncertainty an important
research topic.
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In theories of choice under uncertainty used in social
sciences and behavioural ecology, the only variables
that should inﬂuence a choice are the judged prob-
abilities of possible outcomes and the evaluation of
those outcomes. However, the choices can vary greatly
in the level of information available to the decision
maker. The probability distributions of outcomes are
not always fully known, and conﬁdence in judged
probability can vary widely. In some choices, such as
gambling on a roulette wheel, probability can be
conﬁdently judged from relative frequencies, event
histories or an accepted theory. At the other extreme,
such as in weather forecasts for distant tourist
destinations, probabilities are based on meagre or
conﬂicting evidence, where important information is
clearly missing. These two forms of uncertainty are
often called risky and ambiguous, respectively. Stan-
dard expected utility theory, however, precludes agents
from acting differently in the face of risk and ambiguity:
even when probabilities are unknown, the agent may
still assign probabilities to all possible events before
making decisions; otherwise inconsistencies will affect
the agent’s decisions (Ellsberg 1961). Competing
theories view risk and ambiguity as two extremes of a
continuum of uncertainty or as two distinct forms of
uncertainty with possibly separate underlying neural
systems. It is noted that decision makers often have
only partial and changing information about probabil-
ities and thus operate by deﬁnition on ambiguous
outcomes until probabilities are fully established and
the deﬁnition of risk is fulﬁlled.
Risk denotes the degree of uncertainty inherent in
known probability distributions and can, in the ﬁrst
degree, be expressed as variance (second moment of
probability distribution) or its square root, the standard
deviation(Markowitz1952).Variancereﬂectsthespread
of adistribution andindicates how far possible values are
away from the mathematical expectation of value
(expectedvalue,the‘mean’oftheprobabilitydistribution
of values,deﬁnedasthesumof valuesmultiplied bytheir
respective probabilities). Intuitively, ‘risk’ denotes how
much a decision maker in uncertain situations risks to
gainorloserelativetotheknownmeanpossibleoutcome
(expected value of the known probability distribution).
Probability itself is not a monotonic measure for risk.
For example, in a two-outcome situation such as reward
versus no reward, outcome value increases linearly with
the probability of outcome, whereas risk is maximal at
pZ0.5 and decreases towards higher and lower prob-
abilitiesasitbecomesincreasinglycertainthatsomething
or nothing will be obtained (ﬁgure 1).
Ambiguity, in contrast to risk, refers to situations of
uncertainty in which we have only incomplete infor-
mation about the probability distributions. This occurs
typically when making weather predictions in regions of
the world we are not familiar with or betting in games
whose rules we fail to understand. In controlled
laboratory settings, ambiguity as opposed to risk can
be tested quantitatively in conditions of uncertainty by
withholding parts of information about probabilities.
Economic decision theories, such as expected utility
theory and prospect theory, build on the basic terms of
expected value and uncertainty and incorporate them
into the scalar decision variables of expected utility and
prospect, respectively (Von Neumann & Morgenstern
1944; Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Utility is deﬁned as
the subjective value we design to objective outcome
values; it is measured in an objective manner by
behavioural preferences. Expected utility refers to the
mean of the probability distribution of utilities, deﬁned
as the sum of utilities multiplied by their respective
probabilities. Many decision makers often show
gradually ﬂattening, concave utility functions, indicat-
ing that the gains achieved by ever higher outcomes
become gradually less important. This decreasing
marginal utility leads to the aversion of risky outcomes,
as the potential losses loom larger than the gains.
However, behavioural attitudes towards uncertainty
are not identical across individuals and are not even
constant within the same individuals, as shown in
animal foraging (Caraco et al. 1980, 1990) and human
risk assessments (Weber & Milliman 1997). During
risk seeking, decision makers assign increasingly
greater utility to higher outcomes and show convex
utility functions. The gains from larger than mean
outcomes more than offset the losses incurred by
smaller than mean outcomes, thus encouraging the
choice of risky options. Thus uncertainty inﬂuences the
valuation of outcomes, and expected utility is not only
determined by the expected value of outcomes but also
by their variance. The dependence of expected utility
on variance is captured mathematically by the Taylor
series expansion of expected utility, which separates the
mathematical expectations of value (ﬁrst moment)
from variance (second moment) and higher moments.
This is conceptualized in the mean variance approach
of ﬁnancial decision theory and foraging theory
(Levy & Markowitz 1979; Stephens & Krebs 1986;
Huang & Litzenberger 1988). Ambiguity might have a
similar, and even stronger, inﬂuence on expected utility
compared with risk. Risk-averse people are typically
more willing to bet on risky rather than on ambiguous
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Figure 1. Expected reward and risk as a function of the
probability of reward. Expected reward, measured as math-
ematical expectation of reward, increases linearly with the
probability of reward p (dashed line). Expected reward is
minimalatpZ0andmaximalatpZ1.Risk,measuredasreward
variance (or as its square root, standard deviation), follows an
invertedU functionofprobability and isminimal atpZ0a n d1
andmaximalatpZ0.5(solidcurve).Reprintedwithpermission
from Preuschoff et al.( 2 0 0 6 ) . Copyright q Cell Press.
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ambiguity compared with risk due. Taken together, the
scalar variable of expected utility appears to be
composed of two distinct entities, the expected value
and the uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity.
(b) The reward system and uncertainty
A basic issue in neuroeconomics concerns the neural
processing of key decision variables and the brain
mechanisms underlying decision making under uncer-
tainty. Given that expected value and uncertainty
constitute basic decision variables, it is reasonable to
ask how these variables are processed in the brain.
Electrophysiological studies have identiﬁed the brain’s
reward system as a restricted network of structures,
which include the dopamine neurons of the pars
compacta of substantia nigra and ventral tegmental
area, the striatum, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and
amygdala (Cromwell & Schultz 2003; Fiorillo et al.
2003;Tobleretal.2005;Padoa-Schioppa&Assad2006;
Paton et al. 2006). The pure reward signals in these
structures encode reward value as magnitude or
probability of reward irrespective of other sensory or
motorattributes.Inaddition,expectedrewardinﬂuences
movement-related activity in the parietal cortex, dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex,anterior and posterior cingulate
cortex and striatum (Watanabe 1996; Platt & Glimcher
1999; Shidara & Richmond 2002; Cromwell & Schultz
2003; McCoy et al.2 0 0 3 ; Musallam et al.2 0 0 4 ;
Samejima et al. 2005). Human neuroimaging studies
found regional activations related to expected reward
value in similar brain structures, including the striatum,
globus pallidus, midbrain, medial prefrontal cortex,
OFC and anterior cingulate cortex (Knutson et al.
2005;Preuschoffetal.20 06 ;Tobler etal. 2007).Someof
these regional activations may be due to inputs from
dopamine reward signals. Thus, expected value as a key
economic decision variable appears to be encoded by
neurons in the brain’s reward system.
The rationale for investigating risk and ambiguity
derives from several considerations.
(i) The ubiquitous uncertainty about outcomes of
behaviour needs to be detected and assessed by
individuals in order to gain an accurate percep-
tion of the environment. Different forms and
degrees of uncertainty, such as risk and
ambiguity, should be processed as separate or
quantitatively different signals to optimize their
detection and discrimination, irrespective of
their use for immediate behavioural choices.
(ii) The mean variance approach of ﬁnancial
economics (Levy & Markowitz 1979) postulates
that the ﬁrst two moments of probability
distributions, expected value and variance, are
assessed separately and are combined in a
ﬂexible and adaptive manner to represent the
expected utility of all available outcome options.
By contrast, alternative decision theories, such
as the expected utility framework, do not require
the combination of the ﬁrst two moments but
calculate the expected utility as the sum of the
probability-weighted scalar utilities of all out-
comes.Thecombinationof valueanduncertainty
signals, or the singular expected utility signal,
would provide direct information and explicit
direction for overt choices. Our current data lend
support to the mean–variance approach of utility
andthereforewillbecastintheseterms.However,
by describing these data, we do not exclude the
possible existence of neural signals coding utility
as a scalar variable.
(iii) Magnitude, probability, expected value or uncer-
tainty might be misrepresented in the brain or
inappropriatelyintegrated intoautilitysignaland
thus provide false inputs to neural mechanisms
involvedinchoices.Suchdistortedchoicesignals,
or their distorted inﬂuences during decision
making, might contribute to paradoxical choices,
suchasseeninpreferencereversals,whicharenot
covered by standard expected utility theory and
havegivenrisetoprospecttheory.Itmightbethat
particularneuralsignalsinthebrainsofindividual
decision makers, rather than market or other
external forces, induce the often detrimental
paradoxes of choices. Finding a potential neural
basis for anomalous economic choices would be
analogous to using the speciﬁc properties of
neural signals in the visual cortex for explaining
illusoryperceptions(Livingstone&Hubel1988).
To unravel biological mechanisms, underlying
paradoxicaleconomicdecisionswouldbeamajor
achievement of neuroeconomic studies.
(c) Scope of the review
This review addresses the issue of how uncertainty as a
key determinant of economic choices and a modulator
of learning gives rise to explicit signals in the reward
system of the brain. We present studies designed
speciﬁcally to investigate how reward uncertainty
might be encoded in the neural and metabolic activity
of the brain. We describe initial electrophysiological
studies that revealed risk signals in single neurons and
human imaging studies that built partly on these
studies but went beyond to identify distinct brain
structures coding different forms of uncertainty, even
in relation to risk attitudes of individuals. We believe
that these uncertainty signals represent discrete neural
events that would be useful for the perception of
uncertain environments and for making decisions
under uncertainty. All reviewed studies use predomi-
nantly Pavlovian reward predictors, sometimes overlaid
onto operant responses, and the studies were not
designed to contribute to the distinction between goal-
directed and habit behaviours. Despite the focus on the
reward system, we do not suggest that uncertainty
coding occurs primarily for rewards. Other functional
brain systems have simply been less well investigated,
with notable exceptions (e.g. Basso & Wurtz 1997).
2. RISK SIGNALS IN SINGLE NEURONS
(a) Coding of risk in dopamine neurons
The ﬁrst two moments of a Gaussian probability
distribution, expected value and variance, can be used
to distinguish value from risk of reward. Reward value
can be expressed as the mathematical expectation of
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outcomes, expected value increases monotonically
with the probability of the higher outcome, whereas
risk expressed as standard deviation or variance follows
an inverted U-shaped function of probability, increas-
ing towards pZ0.5 and declining thereafter (ﬁgure 1).
Entropy shows a similar inverted U function, its
maximum being 1 bit at pZ0.5.
We trained two macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
in a Pavlovian task without choice, in which a speciﬁc
visual stimulus on a computer screen indicated the
probability of receiving after 2 s a drop of fruit juice of
ﬁxed magnitude of approximately 0.15 ml (Fiorillo et al.
2003).EmployedprobabilitieswerepZ0,0.25,0.5,0.75
and 1.0. Thus, each stimulus indicated a speciﬁc
probability distribution with two elements, 0 and
0.15 ml. Anticipatory licking responses during the
interval between stimulus and reward increased with
the probability of reward, indicating that the animals
discriminated the stimuli behaviourally according to
expected reward value. We used standard electrophysio-
logical methods and criteria to record extracellularly the
impulse activity of single dopamine neurons in groups
A8, A9 and A10 of the substantia nigra pars compacta
and the medially adjoining ventral tegmental area in the
ventroanterior midbrain.
The majority of dopamine neurons showed transient
responses of impulse activity (activations) to the
reward-predicting stimuli that increased monotonically
with reward probability (Fiorillo et al.2 0 0 3 ).
Additional variations in reward magnitude showed
that the dopamine responses encoded the expected
value (mean) of reward (Tobler et al. 2005). The
activations following the reward itself decreased
monotonically with increasing probability, and the
depressions with reward omission increased with
probability, thus reﬂecting quantitative relationships
of the known reward prediction error coding (Schultz
et al. 1997). These dopamine signals apparently encode
the value of rewards as deﬁned by reward probabilities.
At least one-third of dopamine neurons showed an
additional, separate, slower and more sustained
activation during the interval between the stimulus
and the reward which tended to increase as the interval
elapsed. The signal was the highest at pZ0.5 and lower
at lower and higher probabilities (ﬁgure 2). Owing to
this inverted U-shaped relationship to probability, the
signal correlated best with risk but not with the
expected (mean) value of reward. Whereas the above
experiment varied the probability of reward of a speciﬁc
magnitude, an additional test used distinct conditioned
stimuli, each predicting two different, non-zero reward
magnitudes, each delivered with a probability of 0.5.
Risk was measured as standard deviation or variance of
these distributions. As in the previous experiment, the
sustained activation between stimulus and reward
increased with the risk of reward outcomes. The risk
signal occurred in the same population of dopamine
neurons that encoded reward value but was uncorre-
lated with the more phasic value responses, which
increased monotonically with probability. Thus the
slow, sustained dopamine signal apparently encoded
the risk of rewarding outcomes.
Taken together, dopamine neurons encode at
different time points two fundamentally distinct pieces
of information about reward outcomes. The phasic
signals to stimuli and reward carry information about
reward value prediction and error, whereas the more
sustained signal encodes reward risk. The dopamine
risk signal could provide an input to brain structures
dealing with the assessment of reward risk per se.
Furthermore, it could combine with a reward value
signal, even in the same dopamine neurons, to
represent information about the expected utility in
risk-sensitive individuals, according to the mean
variance concept in ﬁnancial decision theory (Levy &
Markowitz 1979).
(b) Inﬂuence of risk on cortical
movement-related activity
A recent study employing an oculomotor choice task
described a risk signal in the posterior cingulate cortex
(McCoy & Platt 2005). As in one of the dopamine
experiments, the study employed binary reward
distributions with two equiprobable (pZ0.5) reward
magnitudes and different standard deviations. Cingu-
late neurons showed increased activations related to
saccadic eye movements as the risk in the choices
increased. These data suggest the coding of outcome
risk during behavioural choices. The cortical signal
could provide essential information for assessing
the subjective preferences among rewards with
different utilities when making decisions under
conditions of risk.
3. RISK AND AMBIGUITY SIGNALS IN HUMAN
BRAIN STRUCTURES
(a) Coding of risk
The experiments followed the rationale of the record-
ings from dopamine neurons and used variations in the
probability of ﬁxed reward outcomes to assess brain
responses to risk separately from reward value. As with
dopamine neurons, the task design distinguished
between expected reward value, which increased
monotonically with probability, and risk, which varied
as an inverted U function of probability and was the
highest at pZ0.5 and decreased towards lower and
higher probabilities (ﬁgure 1). Rewards were ﬁctive
money units. Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) served to measure human blood oxygenation
levels in response to speciﬁc stimuli predicting reward
outcomes with speciﬁc value and risk (blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD), responses).
One experiment used a card task in which human
participants were presented with two successive cards
containing a number between 1 and 10 (Preuschoff
et al. 2006). Before the ﬁrst card was shown, the
participants placed a bet on which of the two cards
would be higher.Thus,the presentation of the ﬁrst card
indicated the probability of receiving a reward, ranging
from pZ0.0 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1, and presentation of
the second card indicated whether a money reward was
won or not. For instance, if the subject bet on ‘second
card higher’, the probability of winning was given by
the number of cards initially in the deck (always 10)
minus the number displayed on the ﬁrst card (C)a n d
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pZ(10KC)/9. Motivation and stimulus salience were
assessed by measuring the reaction time to detection of
the second card and failed to covary with risk, thus
ruling out these simple confounds of risk coding.
Using the card task, we assessed ﬁrst the coding
of expected reward value as monotonic increases
of BOLD responses with increasing probabilities
(Preuschoff et al. 2006). Regressions using a general
linear model for expected reward value revealed
signiﬁcant BOLD responses during the initial 1 s
following presentation of the ﬁrst card in putamen,
ventral striatum, globus pallidus, anterior cingulate
cortex, midbrain and a few other regions. The BOLD
responses in the ventral striatum and putamen on both
sides increased monotomically across the 10 reward
probabilities that arose as a result of the number on the
ﬁrst card (r
2’s 0.66–0.87). These data obtained with
variations in probability conﬁrm the coding of expected
value in the striatum shown previously with reward
magnitude (Delgado et al. 2000; Elliott et al. 2003;
Knutson et al. 2003).
A second experiment was based on the same,
monotonic versus inverted U distinction between
value and risk and used speciﬁc visual pictures, each
of which predicting a speciﬁc reward magnitude and
probability (pZ0.0–1.0 in steps of 0.25; Tobler et al.
2007). Expected value was tested by varying both
magnitude and probability of reward. BOLD responses
to the stimuli increased monotonically with predicted
reward magnitude and probability in the medial and
ventral striatum. Although some parts of the striatum
encoded magnitude and probability in separation, an
overlapping region in the medial striatum showed
monotonic increases with both measures of reward
value, thus encoding value irrespective of the under-
lying combination of magnitude and probability.
These striatal regions overlapped with those coding
reward probability in the ﬁrst experiment (Preuschoff
et al. 2006).
We investigated the coding of risk in the card task
and aimed to reveal a relatively tonic risk signal similar
to that seen in dopamine neurons during the period
between stimulus and reward (Preuschoff et al. 2006).
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Figure 2. Risk signal in dopamine neurons. (a) Phasic reward value signal reﬂecting reward prediction (left) and more sustained
risk signal during the stimulus–reward interval in a single dopamine neuron. Visual stimuli predicting reward probabilities
(i)0.0, (ii) 0.25, (iii) 0.5, (iv) 0.75 and (v) 1.0alternated semi-randomly betweentrials. Both rewarded andunrewarded trials are
shown at intermediate probabilities; the longer vertical marks in the rasters indicate delivery of the juice reward. (b) Population
histograms of responses shown in (a). Histograms were constructed from every trial in 35–44 neurons per stimulus type
(638 total trials at pZ0 and 1200–1700 trials for all other probabilities). Both rewarded and unrewarded trials are included
at intermediate probabilities. (i) 0.0, (ii) 0.25, (iii) 0.5, (iv) 0.75 and (v) 1.0. (c) Median sustained risk-related activation
of dopamine neurons as a function of reward probability. Plots show the sustained activation as inverted U function of
reward probability, indicating relationship to risk as opposed to value. Data from different stimulus sets and animals are
shown separately. Reprinted with permission from Fiorillo et al. (2003). Copyright q American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
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tested risk coding as inverted U function of probability
during 6 s between the ﬁrst probability-predicting
card and the second reward-indicating card. The
regression revealed activations in an area extending
posterior to and bilateral from the ventral striatum to
the subthalamic nucleus as well as mediodorsal
thalamic nucleus,midbrain and bilateral anterior insula
(ﬁgure 3a). Subsequent regressions on the slope
coefﬁcient beta of the general linear model revealed
signiﬁcant correlations of BOLD responses with risk as
an inverted U function across all probabilities in the
ventral striatum on both sides, midbrain and thalamus
(ﬁgure 3b; r
2’s 0.80–0.89). Interestingly, reward
probability was uniformly pZ0.5 during the initial
placement of the bet before the ﬁrst card. Regression of
BOLD responses during this period was signiﬁcant,
and betas were within the same range as with
activations between the two cards at pZ0.5 (grey dots
in ﬁgure 3b). A separate activation in the anterior insula
covaried with the difference between the actual risk
informed by each card and its prediction (risk
prediction error).
The ventral striatum showed an interesting time-
dependent conjunction of value and risk coding
(Preuschoff et al.2 0 0 6 ). We mapped the BOLD
responses for the expected reward during the initial
1 s period following the ﬁrst card, together with risk
during the 6 s period following the ﬁrst card. We found
an overlapping region in the left ventral striatum in
which the BOLD response covaried early with expected
reward increasing monotonically with probability but
subsequently reﬂected the risk following an inverted
U function of probability.
We assessed risk also in the picture task, using the
scheme of inverted U function of probability (Tobler
et al. 2007). We regressed a more phasic response of
2.5 s duration following the reward probability pre-
dicting stimuli and found that BOLD responses to the
pictures increased with risk in the lateral OFC. The
activations correlated with variance but not expected
value, indicating a distinct risk signal in the OFC. The
OFC was not explored for a more tonic risk signal in
the ﬁrst study (Preuschoff et al. 2006).
Taken together, humans show risk signals in the
ventral striatum, midbrain, anterior insula and OFC.
The risk signals are spatially well separated from reward
value signals and thus occur in different neurons, or they
show at least different time courses in similar ventral
striatal regions. The data obtained with the card task
suggest relatively slow risk signals in human brain
structures that receive dopamine afferents, including
the ventral striatum, and might reﬂect input from the
similar risk signal seen in dopamine neurons. The more
rapid risk signal in the OFC might be distinct from the
slower ones found in the striatum and associated
structures, potentially suggesting that different risk
signals with different time courses occur in separate
brain structures. The results demonstrate that human
risk signals can be investigated with BOLD responses
based onthe meanvarianceconceptin ﬁnancial decision
theory, which separates outcome value from risk.
(b) Covariation of risk signals with individual
risk attitudes
We used a choice version of the picture task to assess
individual risk attitudes (Tobler et al. 2007). Individual
participantschosebetweenasafeandariskygamblewith
thesameexpectedvalue.Theriskygambleproducedone
of two equiprobable (pZ0.5) reward magnitudes. We
assessed the individual attitudes towards risk in a choice
task between safe and risky outcomes. Each time a
participant preferred the safe option, the score of risk
aversion increased by 1, whereas choosing the risky
option decreased it by 1 (four choices). A positive total
scoreindicatedriskaversion,anegativescoreriskseeking
and a zero score risk neutrality.
We regressed the goodness ofﬁt of the risk signals in
all the participants against their individual risk aversion
scores. We found a risk signal in the lateral OFC that
increased with the degree of risk aversion, whereas a
risk signal in a more medial part of OFC increased with
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Figure 3. Risk signals in human ventral striatum. (a) Sustained BOLD response during 6 s correlated with variance as inverted U
function of all-or-none reward probability (random effects, p!0.001; L vst, R vst for left, right ventral striatum). (b) Mean
activations (parameter estimates beta with standard error) for 10 probabilities. Neural responses in striatum increased towards
intermediate probabilities and decreased towards lower and higher probabilities. (i) Left vst and (ii) right vst. Dotted lines
indicate best ﬁt (r
2Z0.88–0.89, p!0.001). Grey data points at pZ0.5 indicate late-onset activation between bet and ﬁrst card
when risk is maximal (pZ0.5). Error barsZstandard error of the mean (s.e.m). Reprinted with permission from Preuschoff et al.
(2006). Copyright q Cell Press.
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anterior superior frontal gyrus showed a decreasing risk
signal only in risk-averse participants, whereas a region
in the caudal inferior frontal gyrus showed an
increasing risk signal only in risk seekers.
These data suggest that risk signals are not the same
across different individuals but vary according to
individual risk attitudes. The individual variations in
risk signals may explain the different attitudes of
individuals towards risk and inﬂuence their decision
making in risky situations.
(c) Coding of ambiguity
Ambiguity refers to the form of uncertainty in which
outcome probabilities are incompletely known, as
opposed to risk where probabilities are known.
Uncertainty-averse individuals often express pessimism
over ambiguous outcomes in being more averse to
ambiguity than to risk; they prefer risky over ambiguous
gambles, indicating an inverse relationship between the
utility of outcomes and the degree of knowledge about
probabilities. Ambiguity can lead to inconsistent
choices and preference reversals; it could be viewed as
a more profound form of uncertainty compared with
risk, with stronger impact on behavioural preferences.
We used choices between certain and uncertain
monetary outcomes in three situations in which the
uncertain option dissociated ambiguity from risk based
on different amounts of information (Hsu et al. 2005):
(i) in the card deck situation, the uncertain option
involved either a risky gamble where probabilities were
known or an ambiguous option with only partly known
probabilities. (ii) The knowledge situation modelled a
more cognitive choice task in which the uncertain
options involved events and facts that fell along a
spectrum from risk to ambiguity, such as temperature
judgments for more (risk) or less well-known cities
(ambiguous). (iii) The informed opponent situation
involved bets of the participant against another person
who has seen a sample of cards from the deck. This
opponent is therefore better informed about the
contents of the ambiguous deck. This condition
corresponds to a commonly posited theory of ambi-
guity aversion: even when there is no informed
opponent, people act as if there is one.
The human fMRI study aimed to identify neural
ambiguity signals by dissociating between the ambig-
uous and risky situations. We used two primary
regressors, one for the safe versus ambiguous choice
and one for the safe versus risky choice, and applied
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Figure 4. Relation of human orbitofrontal risk signals to individual risk attitude. (a,b) Risk signal in lateral OFC covarying with
increasing risk aversion across participants (e.g. a ‘safety’ or ‘fear’ signal). (b) Correlation of contrast estimates of individual
participants with their individual risk aversion (p!0.001, rZ0.74; unpaired t-test in seven risk seekers and six risk averters).
(c,d) Risk signal in medial OFC covarying with risk seeking (Zinverse relation to risk aversion; e.g. a ‘risk seeking’ or ‘gambling’
signal). (d) Risk correlation analogous (rZ0.85, p!0.0001) to (b). Abscissae in (b,d) show risk aversion as expressed by
preference scores (K4 most risk seeking, C4 most risk aversion). To obtain these graphs, we correlated risk-related BOLD
responses to individual risk attitude in two steps. First, we determined in each participant the contrast estimates reﬂecting the
goodness ofﬁt between brain activation and risk (variance as inverted Ufunction of probability). Then, weregressed the contrast
estimates of all participants to their individual behavioural risk preference scores and identiﬁed brain areas showing positive
(a) or negative correlations (c). We plotted the regressions of risk aversion against the contrast estimates in (b,d). Reprinted with
permission from Tobler et al. (2007). Copyright q The American Physiological Society.
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and the time of choice. In the three experimental
situations pooled, BOLD responses were higher for
ambiguous gambles compared with risky ones in the
OFC (ﬁgure 5), amygdala and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex on both sides. The contrast values between
ambiguity and risk were positively correlated with the
degree of ambiguity aversion in the right and left OFC
(r’s 0.37–0.55).
In contrast to the ambiguity signals, we found a risk
signal in the dorsomedial striatum (caudate nucleus)
where BOLD responses were higher for risky compared
with ambiguous outcomes (Hsu et al. 2005). These
striatal activations also correlated with the expected
value of actual choices, whereas no such correlation
was observed in the OFC or amygdala. The striatal risk
signal showed slower time courses with slower build-
ups and peaks compared with the ambiguity signals in
OFC and amygdala. The difference was present in all
three experimental treatments and appeared to be
independent of the behavioural choices. Detection of
this striatal risk signal corroborates the ﬁnding of a risk
signal in the medial striatum (Preuschoff et al. 2006).
Another study used choices between safe and either
ambiguous or risky options comparable to situation
(i) above and identiﬁed a dissociation between
ambiguity and risk signals. Ambiguous gambles
induced BOLD responses in the lateral prefrontal
cortex that covaried with individual ambiguity atti-
tudes, whereas risky gambles activated the parietal
cortex in relation to risk attitudes (Huettel et al. 2006).
Taken together, there might be two ways in which
ambiguity is coded differently from risk. Some brain
structures show stronger BOLD responses to ambig-
uous compared with risky gambles, such as in parts of
frontal cortex and amygdala (Hsu et al.2 0 0 5 ). The
graded, rather than all or none, differences in
uncertainty signals in the same brain structures would
be compatible with the idea of a quantitative continuum
in uncertainty between risk and ambiguity. It is
consistent with a hierarchical Bayes approach to
ambiguity. By contrast, other brain structures show
speciﬁc signals for the two forms of uncertainty that are
distributed across mutually exclusive brain structures,
notablystriatum andparietalcortex(risk)versuspartsof
frontal cortex and amygdala (ambiguity), consistent
with the notion of qualitative differences between risk
and ambiguity (Hsu et al.2 0 0 5 ; Huettel et al.2 0 0 6 ).
This separation constitutes a scheme of double dis-
sociationandsuggeststhattheseregionsprocessriskand
ambiguity as qualitatively different forms of uncertainty.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The studies reviewed show that reward structures in
the human and non-human brains encode basic
microeconomic decision parameters and carry separate
signals for reward value and uncertainty. Individual
dopamine neurons show two different responses to
reward value and risk at different time points,
respectively, conceivably leading to different temporal
proﬁles of release and synaptic concentration of
dopamine. Human BOLD responses, which reﬂect
the metabolic demands of synaptic input activity to
speciﬁc brain structures (Logothetis et al. 2001),
demonstrate the separate coding of the (mathematical)
expectation of reward value and reward risk (variance)
in such dopaminoceptive structures as striatum, insula
and OFC, although non-dopaminergic origins of these
signals are also possible. The risk signals correlate with
individual human risk preferences, suggesting a neural
basis for individual variations in risk attitude. From the
point of view ofﬁnancial decision theory, value and risk
signals could be components of a neural representation
of expected utility. The observed differences in neural
signalling for risk and ambiguity might reﬂect the
different degrees of impact these two forms of
uncertainty have on the utility of behavioural choice
options. Taken together the data suggest largely distinct
contributions of reward structures to the coding of
value and risk as fundamental parameters of ﬁnancial
decision theory.
Our investigations were guided by the mean variance
model of decision making under uncertainty proposed
by ﬁnancial decision theory. This model speciﬁes
expectation and variance of reward as the minimal
parameters necessary for rational choice under uncer-
tainty in an idealized world with Gaussian distri-
butions. Expected value and risk often change
independently and may be balanced against each
risk
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into animal foraging behaviour (Caraco et al. 1980,
1990; Real 1991) and risk assessment, demand
for ﬁxed income securities and pricing of risky
securities in humans (Tobin 1958; Weber & Milliman
1997). Experimental tests conﬁrm these predictions
(Bossaerts & Plott 2004). Thus, it seems to be
advantageous for agents to have independent and
sensitive neural signals of expected value and risk
which combine dynamically into a neural represen-
tation of expected utility according to momentary
options and risk attitudes. The currently observed
neural value and risk signals could provide exactly such
independent pieces of information and could separately
contribute to decisions involving risky options. It is
striking that brain activation in dopaminoceptive
structures reﬂects the separation of expected reward
and risk on which ﬁnancial decision theory is based.
Our neuronal and imaging studies on risk coding
were explicitly conducted under purely perceptual
conditions in which no choice was to be made, whereas
the ambiguity study involved choices. Many levels of
processing intervene between the perception of key
decision parameters and an overt behavioural choice. It
is likely that the brain tracks expected reward and risk
at an initial perceptual level, whereas additional
elements downstream from value and risk signals
would modulate the ﬁnal choice, such as contextual
factors and decisions by others (Abel 1990). As such,
perception of reward and risk may continue even in the
absence of choice. Brain activity would reﬂect primarily
the information gathering for the case where a choice
opportunity would suddenly arise. By contrast, the
BOLD responses to ambiguity occurred during beha-
vioural choices and were stronger when the choices
comprised ambiguous compared with risky outcomes.
These data conﬁrm that risk and ambiguity signals
occur also in choice situations, which appears to
validate the hypothesis of perceptual uncertainty
signals being carried over into choice situations.
Although we assessed the functions of these brain
structuresinthecontextof neuroeconomicexperiments,
we believe that they subserve general aspects of how
organisms explore their environment. Under uncer-
tainty, the brain is alerted to the fact that information is
missing, that choices based on the information available
therefore carry more unknown (and potentially danger-
ous) consequences and that cognitive and behavioural
resources must be mobilized in order to seek out
additional information from the environment.
(a) Potential functions of dopamine risk signal
The two separate dopamine responses appear to relate
to the ﬁrst two moments of reward probability
distributions, namely the phasic reward prediction
error signal (expected value), and the slower, more
sustained and quantitatively lower ramp (variance, or
its square root, standard deviation). Our similarly
designed human imaging studies conﬁrm the distinc-
tions between the two signals in the human brain
(Preuschoff et al. 2006; Tobler et al. 2007).
The dopamine risk response could inform neural
decision mechanisms on the degree of risk involved in a
reward distribution and thus contribute to the known
inﬂuence of risk on behavioural choices. It could also
impact on the normalization of dopamine reward
prediction error signal by standard deviation through
a neural mechanism of mathematical division (Tobler
et al. 2005). A normalized error signal would factor out
the predicted risk of outcomes and may contribute to
stable learning irrespective of risk (Preuschoff &
Bossaerts 2007).
The bidirectional coding of reward prediction error
by the phasic responses of dopamine neurons follows
general principles of learning described by the
Rescorla–Wagner (1972) learning rule. The separate
dopamine risk signal would covary with the attention
induced by risky outcomes and thus might contribute
to learning in situations described by the attentional
learning rules (Mackintosh 1975; Pearce & Hall 1980).
As a possible mechanism, dopamine released by a
ramping dopamine risk signal could enhance the
dopamine concentration induced by the subsequent
phasic reward prediction error signal and thus lead to a
stronger effect of dopamine on post-synaptic learning
mechanisms, although other, possibly more effective,
membrane mechanisms are also conceivable.
(b) Human risk and ambiguity signals
The search for human risk signals assumed similar slow
time courses as found in dopamine neurons. Accor-
dingly, the regressions revealed risk signals in the
striatum with relatively late peak latencies of approxi-
mately 6 s (Preuschoff et al.2 0 0 6 ), which corre-
sponded closely to the time courses of risk signals in
the insula and parietal cortex (Huettel et al. 2005).
Owing to their temporal similarity, these human risk
signals might be derived from the risk signal of
dopamine neurons. As with dopamine neurons, the
slow time courses could serve as a distinction against
faster value signals found in the same brain structures,
such as speciﬁc regions in the ventral striatum in which
the initial response reﬂects expected reward and the
subsequent response reﬂects risk. However, our other
studies searched for risk signals with faster time courses
and indeed found BOLD responses with shorter peak
latencies of approximately 4.0 s in OFC (Tobler et al.
2007). These results offer the intriguing possibility
that different risk signals occur with different time
courses in different brain structures and are driven by
different inputs.
Interestingly, the orbitofrontal risk signals were
correlated with variations in risk attitude of individual
participants (Tobler et al. 2007). The lateral OFC
showed stronger risk signals with increasing individual
risk aversion, whereas medial orbitofrontal activations
correlated with increasing risk seeking. Conceivably,
these risk structures might show differential over-
activity or underactivity in different individuals. As
ﬁnancial decision theory postulates, risk inﬂuences
expected utility in risk-sensitive individuals, and
variations in risk signals between individuals might
inﬂuence the valuation of choice options. As decision
makers are often faced with decisions between
exploration and exploitation, variations in risk signals
could also inﬂuence these decisions by lending higher
values to exploration or exploitation in risk seekers and
avoiders. Thus, variations in risk signals between
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variations in subjective perceptions of risk and overt
choice behaviour in the face of risky outcomes.
Our studies revealed neural signals differentiating
between different degrees of uncertainty. This result
appears to be incompatible with simplistic theories of
decision making which postulate a similar impact of
risk and ambiguity on choice behaviour. There were
potentially two forms of neural distinction between risk
and ambiguity. The striatum, parietal cortex and parts
of frontal cortex encoded risk and ambiguity differen-
tially according to a scheme of double dissociation. By
contrast, other parts offrontal cortex and the amygdala
showed stronger signals for ambiguous compared with
risky gambles, suggesting graded coding of uncertainty
as a quantitative continuum between risk (all prob-
abilities known, lower signal) and full ambiguity (no
probabilities known, higher signal). The graded coding
of uncertainty may reﬂect uniﬁed neural treatment of
risk and ambiguity as limiting cases of a general system
evaluating uncertainty. For this hypothetical neural
mechanism to have an impact on choice behaviour,
ambiguity might be combined with expected value and
integrated into expected utility in a similar way as risk,
although the inﬂuence would be stronger. With this
mechanism, risk-averse individuals would experience a
stronger loss of expected utility with ambiguous
compared with risky outcomes, which is frequently
observed in overt choice behaviour.
The described outcome uncertainty signals occurred
largely in brain structures that constitute foremost
components of the brain’s reward system, including the
striatum, OFC, midbrain and amygdala. Both risk and
value signals were seen in the striatum, although they
differed in time course and regional location within the
striatum (Preuschoff et al. 2006). Some of these
differences may be due to the functional heterogeneity
of inputs to the striatum, such as dopamine afferents, or
local neurons in the striatum. Human imaging signals
derive from large numbers of neurons and reveal only
the strongest common signals while neglecting contri-
butions from more dispersed functional groups. Thus,
it remains to be seen whether separate striatal
territories subserve risk and value or whether neurons
coding these two parameters are intermingled.
The orbitofrontal activations with risk and ambi-
guity correspond to the deﬁcits in decision making in
the Iowa gambling task induced byorbitofrontal lesions
(Bechara et al. 1994, 2000; Mobini et al. 2002; Sanfey
et al. 2003), which occur with ambiguous outcomes
during initial learning and riskyoutcomes after learning
the probabilities. However, deﬁcits in the Iowa
gambling task may also relate to behavioural ﬂexibility,
reversal learning and attention shifting rather than
misperceptions of risk per se (Maia & McClelland 2004;
Dunn et al. 2006). Our ﬁndings may also help to
explain the altered orbitofrontal activations during
risky decisions in drug addicts (Bolla et al. 2005;
Ersche et al. 2005).
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